Page 11 - The Inian EYE 062626

OPINION JUNE 26, 2026 | The Indian Eye 11

sary to safeguard strategic and eco- ern Border Region), Northern Trans-
nomic interests. port and Trade Corridors (Man-
dalay-to-Myitkyina Highway), and
In addition to managing do- Magway Region (Central Heartland).
The post-election political en-
mestic upheavals, China has vironment suggests that the trajec-
been instrumental in providing tory of Myanmar’s civil war may be
transformed into a lower-intensity
Myanmar with a diplomatic conflict rather than a comprehen-

shield. China has helped re- sive resolution. Moreover, historical
patterns of the military’s strategy to-
duce Myanmar’s diplomatic wards armed groups suggest that a
isolation and mitigate puni- status quo phase may occur, and the
civil war is likely to be partial, local-
tive international initiatives ised, and uneven. In the recent past,

against it. It has also facili- Myanmar has witnessed multi-lay-
ered and non-linear peace and rec-
tated Myanmar’s re-entry into This should be examined in relation to India’s strategic interests, as China’s presence is onciliation processes among various
multilateral forums. increasingly intertwined with India’s strategic objectives, including the Act East Policy, North- actors, such as the 2015 Nationwide
east connectivity and border security (File photo) Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The
more likely scenario involves nego-
This Chinese approach certainly tiated arrangements at the regional
From India’s point of view,
has a few long-term consequences, the relationship is evident in efforts Myanmar is not only an important or sub-national level, and a few ac-
to develop bilateral financial mech-
including greater reliance on Chi- anisms to reduce dependence on player in its Act East calculus, but a tors may choose co-existence over
nese investment, technology, finance Western financial systems. Coopera- security concern due to the refugee integration, consolidating control
and trade. From a future perspec- tion has also expanded into advanced inflows into Mizoram and Manipur, within defined territories. For In-
tive, this state of dependency makes technology sectors, including remote cross-border insurgent sanctuaries, dia, the key is to continue engaging
it increasingly difficult for Myanmar sensing projects and space-relat- narcotics trafficking, weapons smug- with the government while maintain-
to balance China against India, Ja- ed initiatives involving the Russian gling, and instability generated by ing mechanisms for access in areas
pan, ASEAN and Western partners. space agency.[20] There have also civil war. Media reports suggest that outside direct state control. India’s
Since the 2021 military coup, connectivity projects meanwhile can
Myanmar has increasingly relied on been reports of possible Russian sup- these issues were part of the Modi– focus on phased, context-sensitive
Hlaing talks.
port for Myanmar’s reconnaissance
Russia as its principal defence part- satellite ambitions, although neither India has been managing the implementation.
ner, with Moscow playing a signifi- government has officially confirmed border with Myanmar in a situation President Min Aung Hlaing’s
cant role in supporting the military’s such cooperation. where the other side lacks a cen- presidency has provided greater op-
campaign against resistance forc- The 2021 military coup was tral authority to deal with; in other portunity for constitutional legitima-
es. Russia has continued to engage a disruption for India—as it was words, the absence of any official au- cy and diplomatic acceptability. India
with Myanmar despite numerous for ASEAN and other geopolitical thority. As per policy, India does not has engaged with Myanmar, while
international sanctions and restric- players. India’s priority was stabil- recognise the EAOs’ authority, also dealing with an insecure border, civil
tions imposed by Western countries. ity along the border. Established due to deep fragmentation within war spillover, the post-coup wave of
Along with China, Russia has helped mechanisms such as sectoral-level the EAOs, even among those groups refugees and drug and arms traffick-
Myanmar mitigate the effects of in- meetings were held with the Myan- that operate along Indian borders. ing, which is exacerbating communi-
ternational isolation and sanctions. mar junta to address issues relating The geographical positioning of ty tensions and conflict in Manipur.
Beyond military assistance, Russia to insurgent activities against India EAOs from India’s perspective is The junta is leaning on China and
has also provided diplomatic, eco- from Myanmar’s territory and other highly sensitive, as it is closely tied to Russia for the bulk of its support.
nomic and technological support. cross-border threats affecting con- India’s strategic outlook and several Regardless of the other relationships
Beyond defence cooperation, being established, India is crucial for
the two countries have developed a nectivity projects and vital maritime infrastructure projects, such as the Myanmar. India can still gain from
Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Trans-
trade. The last such meeting was
broader strategic convergence over held in January 2025. port Project and the India–Myan- this situation as it has the potential to
the past six years. Russia’s state- Economically, the 2024 oper- mar–Thailand Trilateral Highway. influence Myanmar and India simply
owned nuclear corporation, Rosa- ationalisation of the Rupee-Kyat A large portion of these projects cannot afford to be absent.
tom, has partnered with Myanmar Trade Settlement Mechanism has falls within areas where EAOs and
on nuclear energy development and smoothed commerce, as reflected in resistance forces maintain a pres- Dr. Om Prakash Das is a Research Fel-
plans to establish a low-capacity nu- trade data, which reached US$ 2.15 ence. This hinders the completion low at the Southeast Asia & Oceania
clear power plant in the country. At billion, and both sides are now aim- of these projects, and their relevance Centre of the Manohar Parrikar Insti-
the same time, Russia has emerged ing to increase this to US$ 5 billion by could be called into question if the tute for Defence Studies and Analyses
as Myanmar’s leading oil supplier, 2030. India has also strengthened its smooth functioning of economic ac- (MP-IDSA) in New Delhi
accounting for more than 90 per cent position as a ‘first responder’, as evi- tivity through these projects is not Views expressed are of the author and
of the country’s oil imports in 2024. denced by the massive humanitarian assured. Recent advancements by do not necessarily reflect the views of
On the economic front, expanding response during the 2025 earthquake the Myanmar military suggest it is the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the
trade, financial cooperation, invest- through ‘Operation Brahma’, under- regaining offensive momentum and Government of India.
ment promotion, and potential col- scoring its intent to remain a stabilis- has recaptured several strategic ter-
laboration on infrastructure projects ing regional power. This is supported ritories from resistance forces. The ful version of this article first
such as the Dawei Special Econom- by balancing infrastructure develop- The primary areas and territories appeared in the Comments section of
ic Zone have elevated Russia’s role ment with essential capacity building recaptured by the military include the website (www.idsa.in) of Mano-
beyond that of a purely transactional to maintain its strategic foothold in Chin State (Northwestern Border har Parrikar Institute for Defense
partner. Southeast Asia. Region), Tanintharyi Region (South- Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, on
Another important dimension of June 15, 2026

www.TheIndianEYE.com